Your DMARC reports show failures from servers at Microsoft, Google or a university you never send from. Or a colleague's messages to a mailing list bounce. Often the cause is not a configuration error but mail that was passed on after it left you.
Forwarding breaks SPF
When a recipient forwards mail automatically (for example info@their-company.com to a personal Gmail address), the forwarding
server delivers your message from its own IP address. That IP isn't in your SPF record, so SPF fails. This is how SPF is designed and you can't
fix it on your side. Some forwarders rewrite the envelope sender (SRS), which makes SPF pass for their domain, but that doesn't align with yours either.
DKIM usually survives, unless the message is edited
A DKIM signature travels with the message. Plain forwarding keeps it intact, so DMARC still passes. That's why DKIM on all your mail matters so much. But when something changes the message, the signature breaks:
- Mailing lists that add a footer or a
[list-name]tag to the subject. - Security gateways that rewrite links or add warning banners.
Then both SPF and DKIM fail, and with p=reject the message is refused. Modern mailing list software avoids this by rewriting the
From address to the list's own address ("Jan via Team List"), and large receivers use ARC, a chain of signatures from each intermediary,
to accept mail that passed authentication before it was forwarded.
What that means for you
- Expect a small share of failures from forwarding in your reports. It's not a reason to stay at
p=none. - Make sure all your mail is DKIM-signed with your domain. It's what carries mail through plain forwarding.
- Prefer
~allover-allin SPF, so receivers leave the decision to DMARC. See ~all vs -all. - If people in your organisation post to mailing lists that modify messages, check that the list rewrites the From address.